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capita for 146 countries, and the results for China and India are discussed in the 
context of the size of these economies. It also provides insights into the prospects of 
future economic growth in China and India. I believe this paper will be of immense 
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Abstract 
 
Comparisons of India and China have been made for over 50 years. This paper 
focuses on purchasing power estimates in China and India in the 2005 round of the 
UN International Comparison Programme (ICP) that was coordinated by the World 
Bank, the Regional Banks and Economic Commissions. The 2005 ICP round provides 
estimates of purchasing power parities (PPPs) of currencies and real product per 
capita for 146 countries, and the results for China and India are discussed in the 
context of the size of these economies. It also provides insights into the prospects of 
future economic growth in China and India as also policy recommendations for China 
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What Can Be Learned About the Economies of China and India 




University of Pennsylvania 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Comparisons of India and China have been a media and scholarly staple since 1950 
with academic antecedents in the Orientalist tradition and more popular precursors in 
accounts of famine, floods and disease.  Since 1950 there have been economic 
comparisons by Wilfred Malenbaum, T.N. Srinivasan, S. Swamy, and A.K. Sen 
among others.  Scholars, whose principal interest was China, have been wiser, 
perhaps, in concentrating their attention on the Chinese experience, rather than in 
comparisons. My research interests for the past 40 years have concentrated on 
purchasing power estimates across regions and countries, so not surprisingly, this 
paper adopts a comparative framework. 
 
Section 2 of the paper discusses the inter-relationships of purchasing power 
conversions of GDP to economic growth.  Section 3 looks at both China and India in 
the 2005 round of the UN International Comparison Programme (ICP) that was 
coordinated by the World Bank, the Regional Banks and Economic Commissions.
1 
The 2005 ICP round provides estimates of purchasing power parities (PPPs) of 
currencies and real product per capita for 146 countries, and the results for China and 
India are discussed in the context of the size of these economies.  Section 4 discusses 
possible insights that the ICP provides into the sources of past and prospects of future 
economic growth in China and India.  Section 5 concludes with a note on PPPs and 
the ‘appropriate’ exchange rate, the subject in the past several years of a number of 
writings involving both analysis, policy recommendations for China and likely 
scenarios in the future. 
 
2.  The Growth Record in a Comparative Framework 
 
Most discussions of growth rates consider in their comparisons only the national 
statistical record without taking account the levels of economic output at the 
beginning and end of the growth journey for the countries being compared.  Consider 
for example, the following illustration from the Penn World Table (PWT), which has 
attempted to monitor the performance of China and India along with most of the 
worlds’ economies.  The distinctive feature of PWT has been to use purchasing power 
parities to move from GDP and its major components at national currencies to a 
common international unit that we have termed international dollars; and to provide a 
time series of these estimates.  In the latest version, PWT 6.2 the estimates run for 
                                                 
* I am indebted to Surjit S. Bhalla and other participants at the conference on India and China’s Role in 
International Trade and Finance and Global Economic Governance, Indian Council for Research on 
International Economic Relations (ICRIER), New Delhi, Dec. 6-7, 2007 for useful comments. 
1 The first round of the ICP was initiated in 1968, when the author joined the work, and involved 10 
countries, including India, for 1970.  The 2005 round involves 146 countries including all-India and a 
less satisfactory estimate for all of China. See: http://web.worldbank.org/ 
WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/ICPEXT/0,,pagePK:62002243~theSitePK:270065,00.ht
ml and World Bank (2008).   2
some or all the years, 1950 to 2004, for some 168 countries.
2   This version, which is 
under revision, incorporates the 2006 official revisions of China’s national accounts 
based upon new service sector surveys and Chinese official growth rates.  Table 1 
presents the per capita GDP of China and India in 1978 and 2000 in 2000 dollars 
converted at PPPs in columns 1 and 2.  Columns 3 and 4 express these relative to the 
United States.  If taken individually the economic performance of each country over 
this period might not raise eyebrows.  But when China is compared to India, the 
estimates become implausible moving backward from 2000 (Column 5): in 1952 
using official growth rates of both countries, an admittedly questionable excursion, 
India is 2.43 times China’s per capita GDP. 
 
Table 1:  Per Capita GDP Levels at 2000 Prices from PWT 6.2 
 











2003  $ 4970  $ 2990  14.3%  8.6%  0.60 
1978  $ 669  $ 1318  3.2%  6.0%  1.97 
1952  $ 326  $ 794  2.7%  6.3%  2.43 
 
Scholars such as Eckstein (1977), Malenbaum (1982), Swamy (1973), Clark (1965), 
and others who have looked at both countries over the past 50 years, might have given 
India a slight edge in 1952; China was emerging from civil war to a frosty 
international reception, while India had gained its independence, written its 
constitution and launched its First 5 year plan with international assistance.  However, 
despite the ups and downs of China until 1978, observers would put China above 
India at the start of reforms in 1978; this conclusion would be based on a variety of 
real measures like caloric consumption, energy consumption, primary education and 
health status. Further, there are purchasing power studies around the beginning of 
reforms in China that clearly put Chinese per capita GDP above India by 20 to 50 
percent.
3   Clearly official growth rates for both countries do not describe their 
comparative experience within acceptable margins, and may not be a very good 
starting point for understanding their growth experience or the lessons they provide 
for other countries. 
                                                 
2 See pwt.econ.upenn.edu. 
3 Eckstein (1977) put Indian per capita GDP in 1952 at $50 and that of China at $60.  Hollister (1958) 
undertook a bi-lateral PPP comparison of China and the U.S, for 1952 and 1955, placing China at 
$146 in 1955.  In PWT, India was $145 in 1955, both in current prices.  The closeness of these 2 
numbers is totally by chance, but certainly places China in a similar position to India.  Kravis (1984) 
carried out China-US PPP comparison that put per capita GDP at 12% of the US in 1975, and that of 
India, 6%, again very different from the what is implied by official growth rates going back from 
2000. Ahmad (1983) carried out a PPP study for 1981 that also included India.  It impied that in 1981 
China’s per capita GDP was 50% above that of India. The study used by Maddison (1998) in his 
work on China is based on Ren Ruoen and Chen Kai (1995), that less so than, Kravis, suggests 
China’s economic position was higher than implied by official growth rates. 
   3
What is the Explanation? 
 
Most literature puts the blame on China’s official growth rates.  However, the 
discussion often gets complicated.
4   For example, it is frequently argued that if 
anything, China has underestimated its GDP, so how can it have over-stated its 
growth rates?  The   answer, in fact, is that the two phenomena are quite compatible.
5  
Critics of Chinese growth rates have argued that the Chinese price statistics have 
underestimated the degree of inflation while defenders (Klein and Ozmucur, 2003) 
have pointed out that China has not made corrections for quality improvements, so in 
fact price indexes have a tendency to over-state inflation. 
 
The recent paper by Harry Wu (2007) has focused on the official incorporation by 
China of their 2006 revisions of national accounts and he proposes a more plausible 
explanation.  In the official revisions the current price statistics were adjusted 
upwards to reflect previously unrecorded output, particularly in the service sector.  
This was followed by a constant price series that is the basis for the estimation of 
growth rates of GDP.  What Wu shows is that the official growth rates were 
maintained throughout the 1990-2005 period, while the current price production 
statistics showed some decline in the 1997-98 period in response to the Asian 
financial crisis. The only way to achieve the planned growth rates was to adjust the 
deflators of GDP downward in an inexplicable and undocumented way, so as to 
preserve the planned level of growth. 
 
Put another way, OECD members and many other countries including India have 
followed the UN System of National Accounts over the past 40 years, and compute 
real GDP growth series by dividing estimates of current production by independently 
estimated price deflators.  The rate of growth is thus a residual.  What Wu is arguing 
is that in China, current production and planned growth rates are taken as truth, and 
the GDP deflator is residually derived.
6   In contrast to China, Indian planning 
shortfalls have historically been freely reported with the opposition blaming policies 
of the current government, and with the current government blaming external factors, 
like the monsoon.  None of this necessarily puts into question the increasingly 
accepted view that China is now or soon will be the second largest economy in the 
world.  However, this discussion of growth rates is intended to question some of the 
projections of growth for China into the future for two reasons, one because of likely 
overstatement, and two because of structural factors to be discussed in Section 4. 
                                                 
4  The discussion here focuses on growth rates, but there has also been a fairly heated discussion 
between Carsten Holtz and Angus Maddison (Holz, 2006) regarding the latter’s adjustments to levels 
of Chinese GDP. 
5 Many adjustments that raise the level of GDP or major components are done once only, but many 
require substantial adjustments in earlier years too.  Suppose older series put GDP at 50 in 1990 and 
100 in 2005, with the service sector being 15 and 30 respectively.  A new survey raises the service 
sector to 50 and GDP to 120 in 2005, and to 30 and 65 in 1990.  The old growth showed a doubling 
(100/50) of output the 15 years, and the new growth rate, an 85% increase. (120/65 – 1)*100.  This 
amounts to a slower growth than before correcting for undercounting of the level of services in GDP. 
6 China derives its constant price series from the production side of the accounts which means that 
there are different deflators for the major sectors like agriculture, industry, services and the like.  The 
implication of Wu’s analysis is that the deflators of some of these sectors take up the slack.  Section 4 
discusses the likely case that deflation of the tertiary sector is a suspect and the implication this has 
for understanding future growth prospects in both China and India. 
   4
Maddison and Wu (2007) have suggested lower growth rates than official rates, 
namely 7.85% p.a. versus 9.60% for total GDP.  This growth restatement is based 
primarily on adjustments to the official rates for industrial production and services.  
Table 2 presents in column (1) the official levels of GDP per capita for China where 
the value in 2003 is set as an index of 100; columns (2)-(4) do the same for the 
Maddisson and Wu estimates (MW) and the PWT 6.2 estimates for China and India.  
Column (1) suggests that compared to 2003 levels of 100, per capita GDP at constant 
prices was 6.9 in 1952 and only 13.6 at the start of reforms.
7 
 
Table 2:  Official, MW, and PWT Indexes of Per Capita GDP 
 



















1952 6.9  11.2  6.6 26.5  1.00  2.43 
1978 13.6  20.4  13.5  44.1  0.91  1.97 
1990 31.7  39.0  33.6  63.5  0.69  1.13 
2003 100.0  100.0  100.0 100.0  0.42  0.60 
 
The adjustments proposed by Maddison and Wu are incorporated in column 
(2).Column (3) is close to, but not identical to the official series in column (1); the 
difference arises because PWT applies slightly different weights than contained in the 
official statistics to the growth rates of the four expenditure components, 
consumption, investment, government and the net foreign balance.
8 
 
Column (5) asks the following question?  If India and China had equal per capita 
GDPs in 1952, what would be the relationship of India to China in subsequent years 
assuming the PWT values for India and the adjustments of Maddison and Wu for 
China?  So in column (5) for 1952 the ratio of GDP per capita of India to China is 
taken as 1.00 Even though China experienced much larger swings during the Great 
Leap and Cultural Revolution the experience of China and India over the whole 
period 1952 to 1978 was fairly similar, namely slow growth. In the column (5) 
scenario, China pulled significantly ahead of India after the reforms began in 1978 
reaching a per capita GDP in 2003 that was more than double that of India. 
 
Column (6) is simply a restatement of the last column of Table 1, filling in the rows of 
Table 2. for years in addition to 1978 that are used by Maddison and Wu.  As noted, 
column (6) relies on official series in China and India, using PPPs for GDP that are 
                                                 
7 Official Chinese statistics present a time series of national accounts beginning in 1978.  However the 
State Statistical Bureau and the Hitotsubashi University (1997) put the national accounts of China in 
the form of the UN system of national accounts (SNA) from 1952 to 1978.   These estimates were 
based adjustments of the older national accounts of China that used the Material Product System of 
national accounts used in Soviet-bloc countries. 
8 The relation of the indexes of India to China may appear larger in Table 2 (Column 4 to 3) than in 
Table 1; this is because in Table 2, 2003 is set at 100 for both countries.  Because the level of per 
capita GDP in China is much larger than India in 2003, it is not really appropriate to compare the two 
indexes. 
   5
somewhat different than those of Maddison and Wu to obtain the starting levels of 
GDP per capita.  The conclusion is that the growth rates of China implicit in column 
(5) provide us with a much more plausible comparison of the economic performance 
of China and India than provided by column 6.
9 
 
The discussion of growth rates so far has focused on consistency over the past 30 to 
55 years.  But our conclusion clearly has implications for projections that are based 
upon past growth rates. For example, the Economist (June, 30, 2007, p.31) presents a 
Goldman Sachs GDP forecast, beginning at a lower base than PWT, that puts the total 
size of the Chinese economy as passing the United States 2025, when both would 
have $20 trillion in 2006 prices.  Such forecasts are based on past official growth 
rates, which if overstated, bring into question the value of such projections.  There are 
other reasons that past growth, at official or other rates, may not be a guide to future 
experience, which are taken up on Section 4. 
 
3.  Levels of GDP in China and India 
 
China and India have been leaders in advocating that their votes in the IMF should be 
based upon their GDP converted at PPPs; while at the same time maintaining that the 
United Nations should continue the use of exchange rates for determining their 
contributions.  This is hardly surprising since votes in the UN are primarily by 
membership and in the World Bank and IMF by size of the economy. Compared to 
exchange rates, the use of PPPs would in 2003 raise China’s GDP by a factor of 4.2 
and India’s by 5.7 relative to the United States in PWT. 
 
Another way to express this relationship is the national price level, the PPP/Exchange 
Rate expressed as a percentage.  In 2003 these estimates in PWT were 17.5 in India 
and 23.9 in China, meaning it would take $ 0.175 in India and $ 0.239 in China to 
purchase what a dollar would buy in the United States over the bundle of goods that 
make up GDP.  The fact that non-tradable goods like construction, education, 
personal services and general government comprise over half of GDP helps make 
such differences easier to comprehend. The PWT estimates of PPPs for China and 
India are approximately the same as those used in the World Bank and in the IMF for 
its World Economic Outlook.  One point that emerges is that China’s price level is not 
different from that of countries at similar levels of income, a point not usually made 
clear in the discussions of whether the exchange rate of China is undervalued. 
 
More Recent PPP Estimates 
 
The price levels quoted above are at the lower end of the spectrum of estimates that 
have been put forward in recent years for China and India.  That is, they place the 
GDP of these countries higher than others who on plausible grounds argue for 
numbers that are often 2/3 or half of that in PWT or the World Bank.  The good news 
is that the Final Report of the 2005 ICP has been released and includes new estimates 
of real GDP levels for both China and India.  The other news is that the results have 
generated a fair amount of controversy primarily because the substantially lower the 
position of a number of countries in Asia, China and India included, relative to the 
OECD countries. 
                                                 
9 In PWT 6.3 it is proposed to provide series for China using both sets of growth rates.   6
Some Background to the 2005 ICP Estimates 
 
India participated in the first round of the ICP covering 10 countries for 1970 (Kravis, 
Kennessey, Heston and Summers, 1975), and like a number of other countries, has 
had a love-hate relationship with the project over the years.  In contrast, China has 
never fully participated in the ICP, which has given rise to what might be termed 
partial surveys (see footnote 4).  Full participation requires that a country provide a 
detailed distribution of expenditures for about 130 basic headings like rice, public 
transport and residential construction.  For each heading countries must also provide 
national annual average prices of 3-6 product specifications per heading.  This price 
collection is the truly international characteristic of the work that permits estimation 
of PPPs at both detailed and aggregate levels. 
 
The 2005 Estimates 
 
The Asian Development Bank coordinated the 24 Asia-Pacific countries, including 
China and India, who participated in the 2005 ICP comparisons for which the World 
Bank served as the Global Office.  The Final Global results, released in May, 2008 for 
the 146 countries, are summarized in Table 3. Column 1 provides the results of ICP 
2005 and Column 2 the totals in the World Development Indicators (WDI) of the 
World Bank, aggregates that are similar to PWT though there would be differences 
for individual countries.  Both Columns 1 and 2 are much closer to each other than to 
exchange rate totals as given in Column 3, a result found in all rounds of the ICP 
since 1970.  What has caught the attention of many commentators is the smaller share 
of a smaller World GDP of Africa and particularly Asia, the latter accounted for 
mainly by China and India.  (Note also that Japan, Korea and Mexico are in the 
OECD in Table 1).  Turning specifically now to China and India, the new results are 
provided in Table 4 for China, India and select countries including the earlier 
estimates from PWT.  The World Bank Report discusses some important reasons for 
the 40% reduction in the positions of China and India compared to the previous WDI 
(and PWT) results.  The discussion below examines several of these issues and 
suggests how users familiar with the earlier estimates might want to think about the 
new estimates in terms of the place of China and India in the world economy. 
 
Table 3:  The size of the world economy 
 






 ($  billions)  WDI  ExRates 
World-146 countries  54,975  59,712  44,306 
High income: OECD  31,422  31,726  33,342 
Africa 964  1,264  486 
Asia and Pacific  10,971  16,367  4,221 
CIS 2,269  2,171  970 
South America  2,698  2,911  1,411 
West Asia  1,158  932  588 
 
Source:  Taken from Table 1 of the ICP 2005 Report 
   7
One reason offered for the large changes in Table 3 for Asia, Africa and W. Asia is 
that participation in the 2005 ICP was 146 countries, and all benchmark comparisons 
for countries in these 3 regions were non-existent or over 10 years old. 
 
Table 4 presents the final estimates of the Bank placing China as the 2
nd largest 
economy in the world, with Japan 3
rd, and Germany 4
th, just above India.   These 
results are a major departure from exchange rates, but also considerably lower than 
the numbers in PWT or previous Bank publications.  The resources devoted to this 
round of the ICP in terms of regional consultations and price validations were much 
more than in previous comparisons.  So the 2005 round should be much improved, so 
the question arises as to whether there are there reasons that the new numbers are so 
much lower than previous estimates for China and India? 
 
Table 4:  Preliminary World Bank Estimates for 2005 of Levels of China and 
India 
 
















US=100  $ at 
PPPs 
$ at 




China 1721 42 5333  4091  1303720 8.19 
India 707  33  2341  2126  1101318  44.10 
United 
States 
41674 100 12376  41674 296497  1.00 
Japan 30290 118  3870  30290 127800 110.2 
World 7230  81  54976  8971  6128000 
 
Source:  Taken from Table 1 of the ICP 2005 Report 
 
The 2005 Results and Earlier Benchmarks 
 
This section provides 4 reasons why the 2005 Round might lower Asia’s position in 
the world economy in comparison with previous rounds.  We begin with the urban 
nature of price collection in China; 2nd is the treatment of government administrative 
services and other non-priced output; 3rd is linking of regional comparisons into the 
world economy; and 4th is the treatment of the net foreign balance. 
 
(1)  National Average Prices 
 
China agreed to participate in the ICP in the 1993 and 2005 comparisons but on a 
limited basis providing mainly urban prices.  In 1993 the plan was to compare 
Shanghai with Tokyo and Guangdong with Hong Kong; the Shanghai comparison 
was never made public but the Guangdong comparisons was completed and was 
described in the publication of ESCAP (1999).  Of course, that leaves the question of 
how you go from Guangdong to all of China, and in the ESCAP publication, this was   8
not attempted.  Interestingly there is a long tradition of such city-to-city comparisons 
going back to a Shanghai-Tokyo comparison for 1955.
10 
 
The price collection by China in 2005 took place in 11 cities and their surrounding 
areas.  The expenditures refer to all of China and the prices were moved to an all-
China basis to replicate the inputs of fully participating countries. Like the 1993 
comparison, the relationship of urban to rural prices is the critical step and the method 
used in 2005 did not involve any price information beyond that provided to for the 
ICP. There have been no official studies of rural-urban price differences. There are 
urban and rural expenditure surveys that permit comparisons of unit values of many 
food items and several non-food items like tobacco, fuels and power, and transport. 
Some research has been carried out with these expenditure surveys but permission to 
make any results of these studies public has not been forthcoming. Further, even if 
these results were available, the consumption items for which price differences appear 
largest are items like housing, medical, and personal services.
11  These are precisely 
the items that have not been surveyed or measured very well in most studies. 
 
One early argument was that price collection in China was organized in a way that 
provided prices that were too high because of some combination of choice of brand, 
outlet or center for collection. The price collection by China in 2005 took place in 11 
cities and their immediate surrounding areas that had some rural and some urban 
characteristics.  In their review of the Chinese results for the purpose of producing 
new poverty lines Chen and Ravallion (2008, Figure 1) concluded that the provinces 
of 11 ICP cities represented the range of urban poverty lines in all provinces, an 
encouraging finding.  Their conclusion is based on rural and urban poverty price 
levels that they independently estimated by province for 2002. In that study the 11 
urban provinces used in the ICP had an average poverty line of 1243 yuan, which may 
be compared to an all province urban average of 1195 yuan, and an average rural line 
of 849 yuan.  This line was based upon actual region specific food bundles and so it 
can be interpreted as price differences between rural and urban areas for a poverty 
bundle.  It is clear that the 11 ICP provinces were only slightly more affluent than all 
cities. 
 
However, it is unlikely that the 11 cities represented the price levels of urban centers 
in their provinces. For example, Chen and Ravallion report that National Bureau of 
Statistics (NBS) chose those cities because they were most likely to have outlets 
carrying the types of products and brands in the ICP specifications.  Chen and 
Ravallion also note that the rural areas were closer to what would be suburbs than 
rural areas, and of the 1700 outlets sampled (an impressive number in ICP practice) 
about 22% were in these ‘rural’ areas.  They conclude that a downward adjustment of 
35% is required in the 2005 results for China for purposes of approximating prices in 
rural areas in their poverty analysis. 
                                                 
10 See Mizoguchi (1968). This study found that the urban price level in Japan was about 30% higher 
than in China.  The study was also consistent with Colin Clark’s estimates in Clark (1965, 1976). 
11 For example, Aten (2006) shows that for the United States, prices of commodities increase only 
slightly as you move from low income small urban areas to higher income centers like New York or 
San Francisco, whereas service prices rise fairly sharply.  Overall prices differ by over 60% across 
the 38 BLS centers that are surveyed.   9
Brandt and Holz (2006) have made the most comprehensive set of comparisons of 
rural-urban and regional price levels in China for 1990 updating the results to 2004.
12  
As more and more of the urban housing is market priced, the rural-urban differentials 
for rented and owner-occupied housing have increased in China.  However, in their 
work Brandt and Holz only approximate rental differences by the cost of construction 
taking no account of the scarcity value of land.  If there is a direction of error in their 
estimates, it is to understate the difference between rural and urban prices in China.  
Table 5 presents a summary of the Brandt-Holz estimates.
13  For a common or joint 
basket of goods that holds quantities equal, the cost in rural and urban areas for 2004 
is given in columns (1) and (2).  Urban prices as a percent of rural prices are given in 
column (3).  Several points are worth noting. 
 
First there appears to be much more difference between prices across the provinces 
than between rural and urban areas within provinces.  For example, the joint basket in 
rural Beijing is 84.7% higher than in rural Chongquing.  The largest urban-rural 
difference across provinces is 43.5% in Chongquing. The costs of a common basket in 
urban Beijing is 50.9% higher than in urban Chongquing. Table 4 highlights why it is 
difficult to move from urban to national prices in a large country like China. 
 
Consider the 1993 urban comparison that was made for Guangdong-Hong Kong.   
This comparison, which involved statisticians from both countries, estimated that the 
PPP of Rmb/HK$ over GDP was 0.466 when the exchange rate was 0.743, implying a 
price level 62% of that in Hong Kong.  These estimates were done with considerable 
care but often the attempt to compare the same qualities may have led to selecting 
items in China that were not commonly consumed.  This is particularly true in 
clothing and footwear where it was estimated that the price level in China was 64% 
above that of Hong Kong.  Further, these bilateral price levels also tend to overstate 
the prices in China compared to what happens in a multilateral comparison.  But even 
allowing for these factors the price level for Guangdong is likely to have been 55% 
that of Hong Kong in 1993, much higher than the all-China price level of 25% that 
PWT and the Bank are using.  Are such differences between urban and national price 
levels plausible? 
 
Looking at Table 5, urban Guangdong prices are 73% above the average for rural 
China and 34% above urban China.  If these factors were used if would suggest the 
price level in all of China was 35% of Hong Kong circa 1993.  Hong Kong was in 
turn, 82% of the price level of the United States in 1993, so a price level of China that 
was under 30% of the US is consistent with these numbers. 
 
                                                 
12  The Brandt-Holz estimates have been used by Sicular, et.al. (2007) to compare the rural-urban 
income gap in China. 
13 In their paper they prefer an adjusted CPI index for rural areas to update their 1990 base estimates. 
These estimates only go to 2002.  In column 1 their estimates have been extrapolated to 2004.   10
Table 5:  Rural-Urban Price Differences by Province (2004) 
 







Nationwide 1486  1924  129.5 
Beijing 2240  2627  117.3 
Tianjin 1795  2120 118.1 
Hebei 1320  1807  136.9 
Shanxi 1451  2028 139.8 
Neimenggu 1429  1864  130.4 
Liaoning 1393  1963  140.9 
Jilin 1414  1814  128.3 
Heilongjiang 1425  1867  131.0 
Shanghai 2197  2586  117.7 
Jiangsu 1611  2061  127.9 
Zhejiang 1541  2076  134.7 
Anhui 1663  1843  110.8 
Fujian 1561  2127 136.3 
Jiangxi 1489  1883 126.5 
Shandong 1473  1968  133.6 
Henan 1427  1805 126.5 
Hubei 1627  2011  123.6 
Hunan 1835  1956 106.6 
Guangdong 1819  2569  141.2 
Guangxi 1655 1819  109.9 
Hainan 1873  2474 132.1 
Sichuan 1471 1911  129.9 
Guizhou 1924 1862  96.8 
Yunnan 1857 1922  103.5 
Xizang 1654  1846 111.6 
Shaanxi 1911 1953  102.2 
Gansu 1792  1828 102.0 
Qinghai 1547 1951  126.1 
Ningxia 1683 1871  111.2 
Xinjiang 1637 1860  113.6 
Chongqing 1213  1740  143.5 
 
The Brandt-Holz work is based on unit values and has other limitations that leads one 
to ask whether the differences they report by region are high relative to other 
countries.  Aten (2006) reports that for the 38 urban centers used by the US for the 
CPI the differences between small southern urban areas and San Francisco are large, 
80 versus 130% of the US average in 2003.  From the million plus prices collected, 
Aten is able to obtain about 25,000 annual average price observations for 256 entry-
level items collected by the BLS from which price level differences over all of 
consumption can be estimated.  This is a rich data set that has now been updated to 
include 2004 and 2005 with similar findings, so that we can be fairly certain that the 
range across US urban areas is around 60%, suggesting that the Brandt-Holz estimates   11
for China are not unreasonable.  Aten also finds that the gradient of prices from low to 
high is not large for goods, but it is much steeper for services, a common finding of 
previous rounds of the ICP across countries.  Unfortunately, it is service items like 
housing, medical, and personal services that have not been surveyed or measured very 
well in the ICP, or the expenditure surveys that underlie the Brandt-Holz study. 
 
But is the situation of price collection for the ICP so different in China as other large 
developing countries?  There are other large countries like India, Nigeria, Egypt, 
Brazil, Bangladesh or Indonesia, where the extent of coverage of price collection, or 
adjustment to national averages is not as clear.  For the ICP India uses prices in a 
number of cities broadly covering the most important regions of the countries and 
modifies these based upon their rural labor price index.  However, in rapidly growing 
countries like India or China, price collection is not being carried out in an economic 
environment where spatial differences are close to being in long-term balance.  That is 
disparities are probably larger than they will be in less interesting times, and less well 
measured than they will be when the framework for price collection catches up with 
the economies. And the big differences by region are not for commodities, which are 
easier to price, but for services, where differences can easily be 50% or more. The 
main reasons for service price differences are site rent which means services provided 
in large urban areas including housing, must cost more than smaller cities, less 
accessible regions and rural areas; and the lower wage rates of service workers in 
these areas. 
 
This raises a more general question for the ICP as between large, diverse countries 
and smaller city-states. National average prices for countries like Hong Kong, 
Singapore and Luxembourg are quite fully covered in the outlets used for their CPIs. 
However, for large countries like Brazil, China or India this is less likely because 
prices within a country will move in unison over time so the CPI does not require full 
country coverage.  This means the framework for collecting prices for non-tradable 
services does not adequately reflect internal price differences within large developing 
countries compared to very small countries or more affluent highly urban economies.  
This factor tends bias price levels in large developing countries upward.
14 
 
Until there has been more analysis of the detailed ICP results not much more can be 
said about how we should interpret price levels between small and large developing 
countries as reported in the 2005 ICP.
15  One approach to this is to compare unit 
values from expenditure surveys in ICP countries, that do cover the whole of 
                                                 
14 This would tend to lower the volume of services if the national accounts adequately capture the 
expenditures on some of these services, for example the site rent involved in rural housing.  Since the 
national accounts may well miss some of these expenditures, the bias in price collection may well be 
partially offset, so that volume comparisons are less affected. 
15 Large high-income countries like the United States, France or Australia essentially provide urban 
prices for commodities and services. While this is similar to what is done in many of the lower 
income countries in the ICP, the consequences are not large because the higher income countries are 
more urban and make more purchases in urban areas or online.  The EU asks countries to supply an 
adjustment factor to move urban prices to a national level, but the factor used for most items is 1.0 
meaning no adjustment.  There is a directive in the EU for Eurostat to estimate regional price levels 
within countries but this has not been funded or implemented. An important exception is housing, 
where EU countries collect rents on several sizes of apartments and houses, with different amenity 
combinations on a more national level. The US estimates a hedonic regression using the appropriate 
specifications to supply rent price levels.   12
countries, with corresponding ICP prices.  We do have estimates noted above that 
prices in rural China may be 35% below those in urban areas for a poverty bundle.  
For all of China, however, this affect for rural-urban price difference is likely to be 
less because for those not in poverty, a higher proportion of the purchases are for 
goods for which price differences are less.  However, regional differences appear to 
be large in China, and it would appear that price collection took place in urban areas 
with higher than average prices so there would be an added downward regional effect 
that also should be considered.  It should be   noted that China has been very clear on 
where they would price for the 2005 comparisons, and the real problem is how to 
interpret the results.  While these comments may sound critical of the 2005 
benchmark, it is important to understand that we are only able to raise these questions 
because the 2005 comparison has been better documented by individual countries and 
by regions compared to the 1980 and subsequent benchmarks, when regional 
comparisons and fixity were introduced. 
 
A final point relates to the quality of items compared across the wide range of 
economies in the ICP.  On one hand the average quality of goods entering into the 
CPI tends to be lower in poorer countries so it can be argued that they may match 
lower quality items with higher quality items in richer countries, making their price 
levels too low.  This is more likely to have occurred in earlier ICP benchmarks.  In 
contrast more effort was made at Regional meetings to insure exact matching of items 
in ICP 2005. This effect was reinforced by the fact than many of the qualities 
available in the CPIs of poorer countries are not available in higher income countries, 
while the qualities in the CPIs of richer countries can also be found in poorer 
countries. Also, the higher quality items are frequently international brands while 
regional or brand-less products are more important for lower quality items. The 
consequence is that higher quality items tend to dominate the actual list of items 
compared in the ICP. These items will often not be in the CPIs of poorer countries nor 
necessarily available in the outlets normally sampled in their CPIs, the consequence 
being to raise price levels of poorer countries. 
 
The first of the two effects, the use of prices of lower quality items in poorer 
countries, was more prevalent in the earlier ICP benchmarks, and the opposite was 
more frequent in the 2005 ICP because of the stress on and validation of exact 
matches of specifications within the countries of a region and between regions.  The 
net impact on comparisons is that the price levels in the 2005 ICP for lower income 
countries tend to be too high in some expenditure groupings, especially as compared 
to earlier benchmark comparisons.  More research is needed to evaluate what is the 
net effect of the quality factor on the overall comparisons. The conclusion drawn from 
this long discussion of national average prices is that there is some upward bias in the 
price levels of China, and to a lesser extent, India, compared to more affluent 
countries. 
 
(2)  The Equal Productivity Assumption 
 
How does one compare the output of civil servants and health and education workers 
across countries? Because these outputs are not typically priced, in past ICP rounds 
volumes have been derived by dividing compensation by a PPP that was derived from 
a detailed comparison of salaries for specific occupations. It had been recognized that 
this procedure assumed equal productivity across countries in a given occupation,   13
which was unlikely given very different amounts of capital per worker and 
opportunity costs of labor across countries.  Very low-wage economies have little 
inducement to organize work to improve productivity of their employees, including in 
administrative, health and education services.  In the 2005 benchmark, the range of 
countries was much greater than in previous rounds, and some consequences of the 
equal-productivity assumption loomed much larger.  In Asia for example, salaries for 
the same occupation differ by a factor of 100 between Laos and Hong Kong. Similar 
differences exist between Yemen and Kuwait in the Western Asia comparison. 
Without some adjustment for productivity, the resulting per capita volumes in Yemen 
or Viet Nam would greatly exceed those of its richer neighbors.  Such adjustments 
have been considered before by the OECD and the ICP, but the 2005 Asian 




Asia, West Asia and Africa have also carried out such adjustments based on estimates 
of capital per worker in the whole economy of each country.   In Asia, for example, it 
means that the volume of GDP of China and India relative to Hong Kong or 
Singapore will be lower than in previous ICP rounds.  This poses a problem of 
comparability across regions in 2005 because EU-OECD-CIS and South America 
have not made such adjustments. Further, because capital per worker data were not 
available for many countries, it was often necessary to apply the same adjustment 
factor low- income countries that were at different stages of development. 
 
What does this mean for comparing the 2005 results for previous benchmarks?  In 
previous benchmarks, the volume of administrative, health and education services for 
very low wage countries in Africa, Asia, and W. Asia would have been substantially 
lowered if the 2005 procedure had been adopted in those years.  Everything else the 
same the methods adopted for these sectors has the effect of producing a smaller 
spread in real GDP per capita between rich and poor in 2005 than in previous 
benchmarks. 
 
What is the consequence for the 2005 comparison of the mixed application of an 
adjustment for productivity?  A sense of this can be gained from the magnitude of the 
adjustment for China and India and the importance of compensation in GDP.   
Government administrative services and individual services for health and education 
were 5.2% and 6.7% of GDP in China and India in 2005.  Average reported wages 
were 26% and 22% of the ‘productivity adjusted wages’ in China and India.  This 
means that compared to higher income countries where no adjustment was made, 
GDP could have been lowered by as much 30%.
17  However, a conservative estimate 
is that China and India would be at least 10% higher with respect to OECD countries 
without the productivity adjustment.  This is not an argument against a productivity 
                                                 
16 The report on the 1975 ICP round (Kravis, Heston and Summers, 1982, p. 140) compared PPPs of 
un-priced services with those of priced services, and the latter are systematically higher for low-
income countries.  However, it is difficult to substitute priced for un-priced services because most 
countries do not collect an adequate number of prices for purchased services, but it would be an 
improvement on the equal productivity assumption. 
17 The adjustment factors for China and India are taken from Appendix Table D in the Preliminary 
Report but were not reproduced in the final report.  It is not possible without computations with all of 
the input data, which will only be made available to researchers at a later date, to make a more 
precise calculation at the GDP level.   14
adjustment, though the actual implementation was of a ‘one size fits all’ nature; rather 
it helps us better understand where the new view of the position of China and India in 
the Global economy of 2005 is coming from. 
 
(3)  Linking of the Regions 
 
In previous global comparisons linking of regions has often been through only one or 
two countries, in which case the results can be quite sensitive to which are the link 
countries.
18 In 2005 a method that was less sensitive to the choice of countries was 
adopted for linking regions at the basic heading in the ICP.
19  These basic heading 
parities in each region were used to convert the national currency expenditures in each 
country to a volume in the currency of the numeraire country of a region, like Oman 
in Western Asia.  The next step is to aggregate these expenditures and parities for 
each region to a total, like consumption or GDP.  In the 2005 this was done by the 
EKS method, which in effect gives equal weight to Africa, Asia, OECD, South 
America and Western Asia.  PWT, in contrast, uses a method that weights each 
country by its GDP converted at exchange rates.
20  Without going into the merits of 
each approach, let it be said that the PWT approach would tend to increase the share 
of output of Asia in the global GDP by 13-14% or more compared to the 2005 ICP.  
And within regions this would have the effect of lowering incomes for countries like 
Japan and raising them for China and India within Asia.  China would be about half 
the size of the US economy and India under 1/4
 the US, but 4
th largest just above 
Germany, but still well below Japan. 
 
However, there was another important difference in the way EKS was applied in the 
2005 Round related to the practice of fixity.  Initiated by the EU in the 1980 
benchmark, fixity requires the relationship between countries within a region, say 
Germany and France, to be preserved for each level of expenditures in the results 
involving non member countries, like OECD non-EU countries, including the US.  In 
the 2005 ICP, each region adopted fixity, so a method for aggregating the world was 
required.  The method adopted was to treat each region as a unit, with aggregate 
expenditures in the prices of the region as one input with a regional PPP at each basic 
heading as the other input.  The advantage of this approach is that it preserves the 
relationships of each country within the region without any further adjustment.  The 
disadvantage it makes no use of information comparing countries from different 
                                                 
18 Also the linking can be done at a detailed level or an aggregate level.  When it is done at an aggregate 
level as in 1985, it is particularly sensitive to the link countries, e.g., Japan was used to link Asia to 
the OECD. 
19 In the parlance of the ICP there were 18 Ring countries from the 5 regions that undertook special 
pricing.  Based on prices from these countries parities at the basic heading level were estimated for 
the Ring countries that could be linked to each of the 5 regions. The method is described in Diewert 
(2008).  Russia served as the link country between the OECD and the CIS countries in a separate 
exercise carried out by the OECD. 
20 While the Bank and PWT are closer to each other than to the 2005 ICP for China the comments in 
this section only apply to PWT.  The World Bank uses a different method to obtain their WDI 
numbers.  Also, with respect to next point to be taken up, the net foreign balance, the comments only 
apply to PWT.  The WDI for 2005 relied on extrapolation of 1993 results at the GDP level.  This 
means that if exports are constant but their prices fall, as in the case of micro-chips for Singapore, 
GDP growth will overstate the ability of Singapore to convert current production into current 
domestic expenditures in 2005 that underlies their benchmark estimate of GDP.  Other changes in the 
terms of trade will similarly drive a wedge, positively or negatively, between extrapolations and 
current price PPP conversions.   15
regions, for example, Brazil and China.  An alternative is use EKS (or GK) where 
each country is a unit, and find the total output of each region.   If fixity is required, 
then relationships within a region can be preserved by distributing the regional total 
according to the results within each region. 
 
It in fact turns out these two applications of EKS produce fairly large differences in 
the totals for some regions.  The ratios of the regional totals of GDP using unrestricted 
EKS to the published totals are:  Africa 1.00; Asia and the Pacific 1.10; CIS 1.16; 
OECD-EU 1.02; South America 0.99; and Western Asia 1.04.  As can be seen, using 
unrestricted EKS would raise Asian countries relative to the OECD by about 8%, and 
11% relative to South American countries.  Thus the change in the exact application 
of the same aggregation method, EKS, explains away 1/5 of the observed declines in 
the positions of China and India in the world economy. While there is a political 
rationale for the practice of fixity, the academics are solidly behind unconstrained 
methods of aggregation and so would argue that the method used by the Bank should 
be reconsidered in the next round of the ICP scheduled for 2011.
21 
 
(4)  Exports and Imports 
 
In the 2005 round the net foreign balance is converted at exchange rates, a practice 
common in the OECD countries.   In fact it has long been recognized that the proper 
way to deal with trade is to deflate exports by a PPP based on export prices and the 
same for imports.  However, to do this requires collecting of another large set of 
producers prices, making an already formidable task appear too daunting. PWT does 
not do it right either as discussed in a recent paper (Feenstra, Heston, Timmer and 
Deng, 2007). 
 
Are there alternative approaches to a full PPP conversion of exports and imports?  
What is been done in PWT is to convert the net foreign balance at the PPP for 
domestic absorption.  This has one major advantage for the GK approach used in 
PWT, namely that it is symmetric with respect to whether a country has a trade 
surplus or deficit.
22  In Feenstra, et.al, 2007) it was found that there was a significant 
difference for a number of high trade countries between GDP based on expenditures 
as in PWT and GDP based on production taking into an account of the difference in 
parities and volumes of exports and imports. However, among the 146 countries in the 
2005 ICP there are a number in Asia, Africa and Western Asia, where this difference 
can be quite large. 
 
What conclusions can be drawn about where China and India fit into the world 
economy based on the 2005 benchmark? The largest source of difference from past 
practice is the productivity adjustment for government, which certainly is a change in 
the right direction. However, my judgment is that these adjustments produced too 
large a reduction for China and India.  In addition because the adjustments were not 
                                                 
21 It should be pointed out that the way in which the EU links in associate members and other countries 
is highly constrained, so even in the OECD comparisons, the positions of members and non-
members would be different without the restrictions that are imposed. 
22 In PWT the aggregation is over C, I and G, and the net foreign balance is handled as a separate item.  
In EKS as usually carried out, the net foreign balance is included in the aggregation with the 
exchange rate as the parity for that entry.  Other conversion factors could also be used within EKS, or 
for that matter in the GK approach.   16
carried out in the OECD, the most important region for comparison, the overall results 
for Asia are understated in this round.  The difference in aggregation methods also 
operated to reduce Asia substantially in the world, and there is legitimate 
disagreement on whether this was appropriate.  But even the EKS method in the 2005 
ICP was applied to 5 regional aggregates, not the individual countries as in most 
applications.  If countries had been used as in the past, this would have raised the 
position of Asia by 8% compared to the OECD.
23   While there are reasons for 
aggregating by Region, the cost seems high, namely reducing meaningful 
comparisons of countries across regions. 
 
Moving down the list, the difference in treatment of foreign trade is in any event not a 
large effect.  The special pricing in China may well have produced prices that were on 
average higher than for other large countries like Brazil or India. A rough guess as to 
what might be the net impact of defensible changes in the preliminary results 
including applying EKS to countries would be to reduce price levels of China and 
India relative to the US by 25 percent plus or minus at least 5%.  Put another way at 
least half of the much publicized reduction of the incomes of China and India of 40% 
can explained by improved data and changed methods and the productivity 
adjustment for those expenditure headings where PPPs have been based on relative 
wages. 
 
4.  PPPs and Sources of Past and Future Growth 
 
Do the ICP results provide any insights into the sources and prospects for future 
growth in China and India? We have already noted that when one converts China or 
Indian GDP from local to a common currency using PPPs it makes future levels of 
output more obtainable compared to use of exchange rates.  Beyond this, the 
discussion will concern only two of the common explanations for growth and 
limitations on future growth, diminishing marginal productivity of capital and 
structural changes during economic development.  The literature is large and we will 
only take up two recent studies of past growth, both of which compare China and 
India. Bosworth and Collins (2007) covers the period 1978 to 2004, and Herd and 
Dougherty (2007) that goes from 1952 to 2005. Herd and Dougherty, both of whom 
have been involved in the country studies of China and India of the OECD (2005, 
2007), and Bosworth and Collins provide a review of the literature on sources of 
growth for the two countries; readers are referred to either paper for a fuller 
discussion. 
 
Some conclusions drawn in the studies are given below: 
 
1.  Growth of physical capital has accounted for more than double the growth a 
larger proportion of total growth in China compared to India. 
2.  TFP has been a more important source of growth in China than in India in 
absolute terms in the period of reforms.  However, in the 1950-80 period, it 
was stagnant in China compared to India.  Relative to total growth, Bosworth 
                                                 
23 An EKS was run on the individual countries and regional aggregates were summed up and compared 
with the regional aggregates that are part of the 2995 Final Report.  Compared to the OECD, Asia-
Pacific rose by 8% and South America declined by 1%.  This means that a comparison of India to 
say Brazil would put India 9% higher if the EKS were applied to countries not regions.   17
and Collins find it is also more important in China than India, and Herd and 
Dougherty the opposite. 
3.  Both papers estimate the contribution to total growth of the reallocation of the 
work force from the lower productivity primary sector to the higher 
productivity secondary and tertiary sectors.  Both studies find this shift in 
resources an important source of growth in both countries, more important in 
China than India during the reform period. 
4.  Bosworth and Collins put the output per worker in China in the secondary 
sector as 7 times the primary, while in India secondary is less than 5 times 
higher than primary.   Further, output per worker is higher in both sectors in 
China than in India, providing China with more potential gains from shifting 
resources. 
5.  However, in India the output per worker in the formal sector is almost 20 
times as high as the informal sector (agricultural plus informal secondary and 
tertiary employees), suggesting major potential for output gains. 
 
In looking to the future, aside from the common emphasis on maintaining high rates 
of investment, there are differences in the two studies. Bosworth and Collins see the 
potential for both China and India to maintain their recent rates of growth so long as 
they continue their reforms and participation in the international economy.  Herd and 
Dougherty believe that there are more constraints on future growth in China than 
India, so long as the latter can achieve major labor market reforms. The discussion 
below considers the conclusions of these studies from the perspective of purchasing 
power research that focuses heavily on relative prices. 
 
Role of Capital and Relative Price of Investment Goods 
 
In explaining the sources of total factor productivity (TFP) growth in China and India, 
capital accumulation is seen to play a major role.  India makes official estimates of 
capital stock in rupees but not China.  Therefore both studies make independent 
estimates of the capital stock in China, and allow for both labor quantity and quality, 
in their analysis, albeit with differences in the adjustments they make. These capital 
stock estimates are in national prices that tend to overstate the role of capital 
formation. 
 
China and India follow a common pattern of relative prices that at first may seem 
paradoxical, namely their prices of investment goods are relatively high.  Since both 
countries are major exporters of producers durable equipment, how can their prices be 
high? The answer is we are referring to relative prices.  We can illustrate this using 
the GDP price levels of China and India of 23.9 and 17.5 noted above for 2003 from 
PWT; and the same pattern was found in the 2005 ICP.  In comparison the price 
levels of investment goods including construction are 32 and 35 respectively; so 
investment goods are still inexpensive with respect to world prices, but not compared 
to other expenditures in GDP, namely government and household consumption. In 
contrast, investment goods are relatively inexpensive in countries like Japan and the 
United States compared to consumption. 
 
This means that in national currencies the share of investment in countries like China 
and India is over-stated and therefore their ratio of capital to output is over-stated 
compared higher per capita income countries.  Rather than 43% of GDP, PWT would   18
estimate China’s investment share at 32% in 2004.  That is, the real amount of 
physical capital that is being put up each year compared to the quantities of other 
goods is smaller.  This is an aspect of relative prices that is frequently overlooked in 
international comparisons of productivity.  The effect of using comparable measures 
of capital to output across countries does not have to decrease contribution of capital 
to growth but that is certainly a working hypothesis. 
 
However, this finding is related to another unusual aspect of the Chinese economy, 
the reported 47% consumption out of GDP in 2005, and a correspondingly high rate 
of savings. Savings can be measured as the (1) net additions of owned assets by the 
enterprise, household and government sectors of the economy; or as (2) the difference 
between GDP and consumption expenditures of households and government; or as (3) 
the sum of foreign and domestic investment expenditures. Most countries are able to 
independently check estimates from all of these sources, where often (2) is considered 
the most reliable.  In China, GDP is estimated from the production side, and the 
expenditure side of the accounts is more problematic, with differences that must be 
allocated to various expenditure headings.  It is a common conjecture that China’s 
savings estimates are much too high and consumption levels too low.
24 
 
Financial Repression and the Efficiency of Capital Use 
 
In his paper in this volume, Jehangir Aziz (2007) asks the question of whether 
estimated growth from a model without financial frictions tracks actual experience 
and compared to a model that does introduce wedges in financial markets. He finds 
that a financial repression model does the better job of tracking Chinese experience. 
He considers the wedge as a borrowing constraint on smaller privately owned firms as 
well as due to a repressed banking system replete with non-performing loans.  The 
very high savings rates in China represents a tax on consumers and on small 
businesses that must seek financing from their own savings. Consumers must save 
more because the returns they can earn on assets is low because of the low cost of 
capital made available to State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). And small firms are 
constrained in access to credit so they must rely on a great deal of internal financing. 
In contrast, Aziz argues that when account is taken of subsidies for energy and other 
costs, SOEs effectively have negative borrowing rates so if they can make 
investments, the incentive is there to invest at any positive return. 
 
Perkins and Rawski (2008) have made a related argument that the investment choices 
made by the SOEs and other government related entities have generated a very 
inefficient use of capital because of the absence of incentives to optimize choices 
when the cost of capital is so cheap. Is this claim that China’s investments have been 
poorly allocated consistent with the TFP studies cited above? The answer is yes 
because high rates of investment have been associated with high growth of output, but 
probably not the source of this growth to the extent implied by these studies. Because 
the labor force reallocations have been underestimated because of residential permit 
system, this latter source of growth has probably been underestimated. 
                                                 
24 Kraay (2000), provides an analysis of Chinese savings, that while several years old, makes points 
about over-statement that are still timely.   19
Table 6:  Completed Investment in China by Quarters 
 
Year 1975  1990  2000  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Q1+Q2 33.8  28.3 31.1  33.7  35.3  37.3  37.2 
Q4 42.6  48.3  44.4  39.9  37.8  35.1  35.1 
 
Source:  Adopted from Perkins and Rawski (2008) Table 20.9 
 
One piece of evidence cited by Perkins and Rawski (Table 20.9, 2008) is the seasonal 
aspect of investment in China. Table 6 shows that in pre-reform China in 1975, over 
40% of investment occurred in the 4
th quarter while only 1/3
rd of annual investment 
took place in the lst two quarters. Rawski argues that this illustrates the situation 
where SOEs had more funds than good ideas and so made a rush to invest in poorly 
planned projects in the last quarter of each year. The evidence in Table 6 suggests this 
seasonal pattern was maintained or even more exaggerated in the first 15 years of 
reform and only in the more recent years when the share of private investment has 
increased has the allocation become more evenly distributed. 
 
There are two possible qualifications to this argument.  First, it might be argued that 
this investment pattern is somehow seasonally related to weather conditions, 
construction conditions being unfavorable in the lst quarter of each year.  To check on 
this provincial investment patterns were related to January and annual average 
temperatures, and indeed there is the expected relationship. However, correcting for 
this, there still remained a substantial excess of investment in the 4
th quarter compared 
to the lst quarter in all provinces.
25 
 
A second qualification is that if current price investment is growing due to either price 
changes or real changes, then one would expect that 4
th quarter investment to be 
higher than 1
st quarter investment. It is easy enough to allow for this effect by 
calculating expected levels in each quarter using quarterly growth rates derived from 
the annual increase in a given year.  For example, in 2006 the expected national ratio 
of lst quarter to 4
th quarter investment was .849 whereas the actual ratio was .367, a 
clear indication of the crowding of investment into the 4
th quarter. Of more relevance 
is whether continued high rates of investment can contribute to future growth as much 
as in the past.  When economies are re-allocating from low to high output per worker 
sectors, the impact of the new investment is likely to be higher than when additional 
investment is directed to increasing capital per worker within a sector.  In the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe it was commonly felt that continued high rates of 
investment in the 35% range would run into diminishing returns as pools of low 
                                                 
25 The coefficient on January temperatures was positively and significantly associated with the ratio of 
lst to 4
th quarter investment across the 31 provinces in 2003 and 2006, the only two years examined.  
The equation did a good job of prediction for the colder provinces like Jilin, Liaoning, Heilongjiang 
and Inner Mongolia.  However, the residuals were much larger for provinces with above freezing 
January temperatures, and may be related to the extent of private investment in the province.   If we 
made an upward adjustment in 1st quarter investment for those provinces with negative January 
temperatures, the overall effect would be to raise the national ratio by under .01, say .37 to .38 in 
2006.   20
productivity labor dried up.  This is a potential constraint on growth faced by China 
and to a somewhat lesser extent, India.  Herd and Dougherty also believe that India 
has not freed up their labor markets as much as China since 1978; they conclude there 
remains more potential for growth from moving labor to higher productivity sectors in 
India than China. In conclusion, we would argue that TFP studies show that China 
and India can gain from additional investment but that the notion that is the desirable 
engine of growth seems problematic.  Efficient use of capital coupled with facilitating 
continued movement of low productivity labor to more productive sectors would 
move both countries much closer to their production possibility frontier. 
 
The Tertiary Sector 
 
One of the curious findings of Bosworth and Collins is that output growth in the 
tertiary sector of China is higher than in India.  This appears paradoxical as China is 
viewed as producing commodities for the world and India is the call center for the 
OECD.  Maddison and Wu (2007) suggest one factor that may help us understand 
what is happening here. Transportation and commerce services in China were 12.4% 
of GDP in 2003 and ‘non-material’ services 15.8%. Officially, output per worker rose 
by 4.8% in transport and commerce and 5.1% in ‘non-material’ services during the 
period 1978 to 2002. There is little explanation of how one would arrive at that type 
of labor productivity growth for ‘non-material’ services that include general 
government and health and education. ‘Non-material’ services are very difficult areas 
of national statistics to pin down, but in general they are thought to be subject to 
Baumol’s disease, where productivity increases are difficult to achieve.
26 
 
It would be understandable in the case of India that the increase in the proportion of 
service workers in IT type activities to lead to increases in output per worker.   
However, in the case of ‘non-material’ services, which have declined as a share of the 
tertiary sector, the type of labor productivity growth assumed in China since 1978 
seems much too high.  One conclusion is that without further explanation of how 
China arrives at their high productivity growth for ‘non-material’ services it seems 
much more likely that this sector will serve as a constraint on growth rather than a 
high growth sector. 
 
Returning to Baumol’s disease, there is every reason to believe that both China and 
India will face the same problems of many OECD countries.  As income per capita 
increases, demand shifts to sectors where productivity gains have been harder to 
achieve than in manufacturing.  In this context, it is interesting that one of the 
productivity gains in marketing in the last 20 years has been reduction of the supply 
chain from producer to consumer, through direct purchases by final retailers, or one 
level of wholesalers. In India resistance to the big box stores has been pushed by the 
small retailers and taken up by some political parties to pass laws restricting their 
entry.  This was a familiar battle in the United States in the 1930s and beyond leading 
to legislation that provided some restrictions on large retailers.  Many of the 
restrictions of the Robinson-Patman Act had the desirable effect of reducing the types 
of price-discrimination that do not increase efficiency, but only redistribute gains of 
reducing the supply chain. See Kumar, Patwari and Ayush (2008). 
 
                                                 
26 See for example, Surowiecki (2003), among many.   21
5.  PPPs and Exchange Rates 
 
In this section the PPP of China is discussed in the context of whether China’s 
currency is being undervalued compared to what it would be if it freely floated.  One 
of the least understood arguments in international economics relates to exchange rates 
and the purchasing power parity doctrine.  After WWI Sweden was concerned as to 
how it should return the kroner to the gold standard, which led Cassel to propose that 
the Swedish authorities be guided by the purchasing power parity of the kroner 
relative to other currencies defined in terms of gold.  This advice was summed up as 
follows: 
 
“I propose to call this parity “the purchasing power parity¹.  As long as anything 
like free movement of merchandise and a somewhat comprehensive trade 
between two countries take place, the actual rate of exchange cannot deviate very 
much from this purchasing power parity.” Gustav Cassel (1918, 413). 
 
Samuelson has suggested that if the Nobel economics prize had been awarded in the 
1920s, Cassel would have received it for this insight.  And surely Cassel would also 
have modified his views as world financial markets changed and capital movements 
have come to dwarf trade in goods and services.  And there were no national accounts 
in Cassel’s world, so the notion of a PPP for GDP as opposed to one only for traded 
goods was not in the vocabulary of his day. 
 
Put another way, PPPs are a sensible way to make quantity comparisons across 
countries by converting expenditures by the relative prices of the items entering into 
the expenditures.  However, the relation of PPPs over GDP to exchange rates is not 
direct and so is not a simple guide as to the level of a country’s exchange rate.  In the 
long run, the purchasing power parity doctrine in its relative form which states that, 
inflation rates, PPPs and exchange rates will move in parallel does tend to hold. 
 
What can be said is that both China and India have ratios of PPPs to their respective 
exchange rates that are not out of line with countries at similar levels of per capita 
income.   This was true in both the older and even more so for the 2005 ICP 
comparison.  In fact a principal finding of the ICP is that the price level 
(PPP/Exchange rate) and the price of non-tradables relative to tradables rise with per 
capita incomes, with the usual explanation being the Balassa-Samuelson effect.
27  
However, the variation about this relationship is especially large for high-income 
countries, with the price level of Hong Kong in the draft Global Report, 73, Japan, 
118 and Switzerland, 140 in 2005 with the US at 100. 
 
One implication of this wide range of price levels of high-income countries has 
become clearer in recent months.  Policy makers in the Euro bloc have recently 
become even more vocal about the exchange rate of China than the United States.  
From the Chinese point of view this is mostly a reflection of the rise of the Euro 
relative to the dollar rather than any policy of the Chinese.  Certainly the asymmetric 
position of the dollar in international monies complicates this discussion.  Again the 
results of purchasing power studies do not provide any special perspective on this 
issue nor on the larger issue of why China wants to maintain such large foreign 
                                                 
27 This is discussed a number of places, e.g., Summers, Heston and Nuxoll (1994).   22
exchange holdings.  However, the paper by van Ark, Erumban, Chen and Kumar 
(2007) in this volume does make a strong case that unit labor costs in China and to a 
lesser extent, India have been highly competitive since 1990 compared to peer 
countries like Hungary, Korea, Mexico and Poland.  And the slow but steady 
appreciation of the remimbi in the past 2 years is certainly consistent with their 
findings. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
Purchasing power studies provide a comparative perspective on the volumes of GDP 
in a common measure across countries and therefore a reading on how well national 
growth rates tell the same story over time as do two cross section readings.   The 
paper concluded that compared to India the growth rates of GDP place China at much 
too low a level at the beginnings of reform and earlier. Much more reasonable results 
across time and space emerge from use of the Maddison-Wu adjustments for China 
than from official series.  One conclusion is that past official growth rates are not 
necessarily a good guide to the future for China, even if everything else remains the 
same. Results from the 2005 global PPP comparisons suggest a much lower GDP than 
the World Bank or PWT had been using, but it is not clear whether this has any 
implications for the discussion of Chinese growth rates. 
 
One concern about the China comparison was discussed in some detail, namely the 
limitation of price collection to 11 urban centers and surrounding rural areas.  In 
addition both China and India share similar problems in adequately representing their 
national price structure compared to small countries, like Hong Kong or Singapore. 
Further the linking of the whole Asian region to the other regions is quite different in 
the 2005 Global Report than in PWT.  In this the Bank followed the methods used in 
Eurostat and the OECD.  The overall impact of the new Bank ICP for 2005 is to lower 
the share of Asia compared to the OECD, a different world economic view than 
previously held. 
 
The adjustments of Maddison and Wu also call into question the results of TFP 
comparisons that suggest the service sector has grown more rapidly in China than 
India.  The tertiary sector typically has very slow growth in productivity leading to 
what has been termed Baumol’s disease, where as economies become more affluent 
they demand more services.  But services productivity does not grow as rapidly as in 
manufacturing and even agriculture, so this becomes a constraint on growth.  As 
Maddison and Wu point out the apparent exceptional behavior in China appears to 
due to assumption about the growth of labor productivity not due to measured 
productivity increases.  Both China and India will face this structural shift to services 
in their economies that may constrain their future growth. 
 
In both countries the price of consumption relative to investment is lower than in 
higher income countries, which is likely to over-state the past contribution of capital, 
as well as its likely future contribution. Further, it has been argued that the 
measurement of capital stock is in national prices in both countries, which are higher 
compared to prices of consumption goods.  This may account for the large role that 
capital accumulation appears to play in studies of TFP in India and even more so in 
China where the movement of labor to higher output sectors has been understated. 
Another major source of post-reform growth has been the allocation of a larger share   23
of the workforce from lower to higher productivity sectors.  This will clearly become 
a constraint on rapid rates of growth in the medium term future and is already 
showing itself in China by outsourcing some items to cheaper SE Asian countries.  It 
does seem likely that India does have more potential for growth from such allocation 
shifts than does China because of the very low productivity in informal enterprises in 
the secondary and tertiary sectors. 
   24
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